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Just the Facts, Ma'am-Determining the
Constitutional Claims of Inmates to the
Sanctity of Their Legal Mail
SANFORD L. BOHRERt & MATTHEW S. BOHRERt
INTRODUCTION
The Bill of Rights exists to protect all of us, including those impris-
oned for crimes.' Some have argued that scrupulous application of the
Bill of Rights to those accused of crimes, even after conviction, serves
the greater purpose of protecting the rest of us whom are either not
accused or wrongfully accused.2 The principle of judicial review
includes the right and obligation of our courts to review the actions of
the legislative and executive branches to ensure that the law of the land,
including the Bill of Rights, is followed.3 Even those imprisoned-
rightly or wrongly-are protected by the Bill of Rights, albeit to a lesser
extent, and the courts provide judicial review to make sure those rights
are respected.4 Generally, the Supreme Court has made it clear that to be
imprisoned lawfully is to have your privileges and rights reduced.5 This
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1. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987) ("Prison walls do not form a barrier
separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution.").
2. See Frank I. Michelman, The Bill of Rights, the Common Law, and the Freedom-Friendly
State, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 401, 412-15 (2003).
3. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-06 (1974) ("When a prison regulation or
practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty to
protect constitutional rights.").
4. Some, however, have questioned the existence of a coherent rationale for such review.
See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2005 Term-Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV. 126, 263 (2006).
This point is underscored by the Supreme Court's most recent decision on point, in which two
justices said the only limit on the conduct of prison officials is the Eighth Amendment, Beard v.
Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 536 (2006) (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., concurring in the judgment), and the
plurality arguably approved of the tautological approach that denying the inmate the exercise of a
constitutional right in effect gives the inmate an incentive to rehabilitate himself. Id. at 531
(plurality opinion).
5. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) ("[L]awful incarceration brings about the
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"retraction," as the Court has called it, is justified by the same considera-
tions that underlie our penal systems.6
We have long understood the constitutional rights of prisoners to be
diminished from those of non-prisoners. The Supreme Court has a well-
established approach that is designed to protect inmates' rights, but only
in the context of "deference to the appropriate prison authorities" and in
accordance with a perceived need to respect (as a matter of separation of
powers) the task that has been committed to another branch. All of this
"counsels a policy of self restraint."7 As one would expect, where an
inmate challenges prison officials' conduct, the burden is on the chal-
lenger to show the unconstitutionality of the rules, policies, or actions.8
The courts must presume that all rules and policies are constitutional
until the challenger can show otherwise.9
As it relates to communications to and from prisoners, especially
mail, and including "legal" mail in particular, however, there has been
an ambiguously defined right for prisoners that has been applied just as
ambiguously. The Supreme Court recently chose not to examine some
legal mail issues in denying a petition for certiorari review of a decision
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Al-Amin v.
Smith. 10 There, Al-Amin alleged that prison officials repeatedly opened
his privileged legal mail outside his presence and thus violated his con-
stitutional rights of access to the courts and free speech. The defendants
moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The dis-
trict court denied the motion, and the Eleventh Circuit reversed on the
access to courts claim and affirmed on the free speech claim, leaving the
latter for trial." The decision was heavily dependent on the facts in the
record.' 2
We have fifty state-prison systems, with fifty sets of rules, fifty sets
necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the
considerations underlying our penal system.") (quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285
(1948)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
6. See Pell, 417 U.S. at 822.
7. Turner, 482 U.S. at 85. Turner involved inmate to inmate correspondence and inmate
marriages, not legal mail, but Turner is viewed as setting a broader standard in the inmate
communications context. As the Eleventh Circuit noted in Al-Amin v. Smith, although Turner's
subject matter was different, "Turner is important because it held that when a prison regulation
impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests." 511 F.3d 1317, 1327 (1 1th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
8. See, e.g., Overton v. Bazetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003).
9. See Bruce J. Winick, The Right To Refuse Mental Health Treatment: A First Amendment
Perspective, 44 U. MAM.I L. REV. 1, 93-95 (1989).
10. 511 F.3d 1317.
11. Id. at 1320.
12. See, e.g., id. at 1320-23.
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of goals, and fifty approaches to achieving those goals while serving
those rules. 1 3 Those rules and goals are afforded substantial deference,
but nonetheless a person does not surrender all of his 4 rights simply by
virtue of entering a prison as a convicted felon. In particular, he retains
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and so prison rules or practices
that infringe on those rights are subject to judicial review and potential
invalidation. "5
Our thesis is that virtually all of the decisions in this area are driven
by the facts, not the law, and that pro se litigants, the lawyers represent-
ing them, and the lawyers for the prosecution are well-advised to focus
not on the philosophical and semantic analysis of Supreme Court deci-
sions and opinions, but rather on the factual matters in the case at hand.
The typically stated concern for inspecting mail is that contraband
such as drugs or illicit items such as hacksaws or other tools might be
delivered to prisoners under the auspices of private correspondence.' 6
"The possibility that contraband will be enclosed in letters, even those
from apparent attorneys, surely warrants prison officials' opening the
letters."' 7 This means that incoming mail, even apparently legal mail,
may be opened and inspected, but not read. In the Eleventh Circuit, the
law is well established that all mail, including legal mail, may be
inspected by prison officials, but that incoming legal mail from an
inmates' attorneys, at least where properly marked as such, "may be
opened only in the presence of the inmate. This inspection is limited to
13. For example, some institutions require inmates to pay for all postage, while some do not,
and some inspect all outgoing mail, which some do not, and a few read every letter, some skim
every letter, and others simply "spot-check" letters, while yet others only look for contraband.
And who does what changes over time. Heath C. Hoffmann et al., Communication Policy
Changes in State Adult Correctional Facilities from 1971 to 2005, 32 CRIM. JUST. REV. 47, 52-53
(2007).
14. According to the Bureau of Justice findings for 2007, there were 1,598,316 prisoners in
federal or state prisons, with only 114,420 of them being female (i.e., roughly 5%). See U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN
(2008), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p07.pdf. For brevity's sake, and in
awareness of this fact, we refer to 'he' instead of "he or she" herein.
15. See Winick, supra note 9, at 13 (describing how, in the case of New York Socialist
Benjamin Gitlow, the Supreme Court recognized that "[flor present purposes we may and do
assume that freedom of speech and of the press-which are protected by the First Amendment
from abridgement by Congress-are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties'
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the
States").
16. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 146 F. App'x 824, 826 (6th Cir. 2005) ("[T]hree
[inmates] decided on smuggling in a hacksaw blade concealed in a legal pad under the guise of
legal mail.").
17. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577 (1974). In State v. Steffes, 659 N.W.2d 445, 449
(Wis. Ct. App. 2003), marijuana was flattened by the inmate's unincarcerated brother and placed
between sheets of papers in an envelope marked "legal papers," and purporting to be from the
public defender's office.
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locating contraband."' 8 The Fifth Circuit clarified that this means that
"freedom from censorship is not equivalent to freedom from inspection
or perusal."' 9
Many things have changed in the prison system over the past cen-
tury, but one thing has not: the ingenuity of prisoners. Speaking of
smuggling "dope" into Sing Sing prison, one author noted the use of
books, magazines, and letters to conceal the drugs and concluded the
"ingenuity of man was exhausted in finding new ways" to beat the sys-
tem."° What has changed is the set of tools available to prisoners. Now
they find that they can sometimes beat the system by faking legal mail. 2
In particular as to mail, the Court has consistently confirmed the
constitutional rights of the inmate to the sanctity of their mail, but just as
consistently (and some would say more so) given a broad deference to
prison officials: so long as there remain channels of communication that
are "reasonable and effective," and so long as there is no discrimination
in terms of content, the prison officials are to be given "latitude."22 The
unanswered question though, is exactly what "reasonable," "effective,"
"discrimination," and "latitude" truly mean. On the other hand, there is
just as explicit an obligation that the State affirmatively preserve those
remaining channel(s) of communication. 3
The courts, however (including the Supreme Court), have struggled
with defining just what rights are retained, to what extent, in what con-
text, and what kind of framework should be used to determine whether
those rights have been infringed upon. This lack of any clear listing of
these rights might be surprising, but in light of a parallel trend in these
18. Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 475 (5th Cir. 1976). In Bonner v. City of Prichard, "the
first case to be heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the court held
"that the decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (the 'former Fifth' or
the 'old Fifth'), as that court existed on September 30, 1981, handed down by that court prior to
the close of business on that date, shall be binding as precedent in the Eleventh Circuit, for this
court, the district courts, and the bankruptcy courts in this circuit." 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11 th Cir.
1981) (en banc).
19. See Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d 816, 821 (5th Cir. 1993).
20. THOMAS MoTr OSBORNE, PRISONS AND COMMON SENSE 86, 87 (1924).
21. See, e.g., Felton v. Lincoln, 429 F. Supp. 2d 226, 234 (D. Mass. 2006) (hate mail was
disguised as attorney-client communications).
22. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 826 (1974) ("So long as reasonable and effective means
of communication remain open and no discrimination in terms of content is involved, we believe
that, in drawing such lines, 'prison officials must be accorded latitude.'") (quoting Cruz v. Beto,
405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972)).
23. See, e.g., Winick, supra note 9, at 40 ("Courts have recognized that even convicted
prisoners have a first amendment right to communicate outside the institution. Moreover, the
public enjoys first amendment protection against unjustified governmental interference with
communications from prisoners .. . . ); William J. Simonitsch, Comment, Visual Body Cavity
Searches Incident to Arrest: Validity Under the Fourth Amendment, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 665,
670 (2000) ("[I]ncarceration is not a wall between the convict and the Constitution.").
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decisions we can make better sense of it. If the Court were primarily
concerned with the rights as an abstract issue, they would likely be moti-
vated to enunciate them clearly. However, that is not the case: in most or
all of these cases, the determinative issue has not been the philosophy,
but rather the facts, or at least the alleged or disputed issues of fact.
While there are those who say the Supreme Court has been changing the
rules to narrow the inmate's rights, analysis of the decisions, including
the most recent decisions in the Eleventh Circuit, indicates that the criti-
cal factor is not the legal standard but, depending on the stage of the
case, the alleged facts or facts or issues of fact in the record, as applied
to the legal standard.
It might seem absurd to discuss whether someone's rights have
been violated without clearly enumerating those rights. One might say
that for a court to determine whether a person's constitutional right has
been infringed, one should know what that constitutional right is, as the
standards applicable to determining infringements of those rights may
differ depending on the right at issue.24 Both of these points are correct,
but nonetheless, the courts have neglected to engage in that analysis
clearly and uniformly. As it relates to mail, or at least "legal" mail, one
could argue that the courts have simply been all over the place, with no
unified or even consistent approach. Thus, in a very recent decision, the
Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that one constitutional right, the "right
of access to the courts," is "grounded in the First Amendment, the Arti-
cle IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Fifth Amendment, and/or
the Fourteenth Amendment."25 If, as many courts say, the reason for
recognizing a right of access to the courts-a right not enumerated in
any provision of or amendment to the ConstitutionZ6-is to permit the
24. Jonathan R. Rosenn, The Constitutionality of Statutes Prohibiting and Pennitting
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 875, 896-97 (1997) ("The standard of review
the U.S. Supreme Court has developed for statutes .... varies. First, statutes that classify on the
basis of a suspect class, i.e., race and alienage, trigger strict scrutiny. Thus, in order for a statute
containing a racial classification to withstand constitutional scrutiny, the statute must serve a
compelling state interest and the classification must be narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
Second, statutes impinging upon fundamental rights also trigger strict scrutiny. Again, the
statute's disparate treatment of one group of people must serve a compelling state interest, and the
classification must be closely tailored to the purpose of the statute. Third, gender-based
classifications trigger intermediate scrutiny, and, therefore, must be substantially related to an
important governmental interest to pass constitutional muster. Finally, laws that neither impinge
upon fundamental rights, nor classify on the basis of a suspect or quasi-suspect class, must be only
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.") (internal citations omitted).
25. AI-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317, 1325 n.17 (11 th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
26. As recently as 1977, Chief Justice Burger noted in a dissent that the Court had not yet
identified the source of any right of access to the courts, nor the location in the law of any
requirement that the states pay for that access. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 833-34 (1977)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). Then Associate Justice Rehnquist added that the majority had
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prisoner to have the tools he needs to take action in courts to attack his
sentence or the conditions of his confinement, 27 one might have thought
the Sixth Amendment would be on that laundry list that forms the
penumbra out of which the right of access arises, but it was not.28 One
court in this Circuit has characterized the issue as, whether opening legal
mail outside the inmate's presence or returning it to him unsent, resulted
in "specific facts demonstrating how he was denied effective representa-
tion by counsel. '29 The Eleventh Circuit also stated, as has the Third
Circuit, that there is a First Amendment freedom of speech right impli-
cated by prison officials' opening of legal mail.3" That is the law for
now in this Circuit, and it provides the only basis for an action without
actual injury. Yet, at the same time, at least two courts have questioned
how, when that attorney mail is merely opened but not read, a speech
right of the recipient of the letter is affected.3 Put more abstractly, they
have wondered how speech can be affected when it is neither suppressed
nor restricted in content.
If this question of prisoners' legal mail is about access to the courts
or freedom of speech, we can look to the broader analysis of those par-
proceeded "to enunciate a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts ... which is
found nowhere in the Constitution." Id. at 839 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The concept, as it
applies to inmates, appears to have arisen in Bounds, which in turn relied upon Ex Parte Hull, 312
U.S. 546 (1941), a habeas corpus case that included no analysis for the proposition, much less an
analysis that would provide a rationale for the context in which it is now being used.
27. See, e.g., Hall v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., No. 07-15376, 2008 WL 5377741, at *1
(1 th Cir. Dec. 24, 2008) ("The Fourteenth Amendment gives prisoners a right of access to the
courts. Inmates are not, however, guaranteed 'the wherewithal to transform themselves into
litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall
claims,' but are only assured '[t]he tools ... need[ed] in order to attack their sentences, directly or
collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of their confinement. Impairment of any other
litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of
conviction and incarceration.' 'The limited types of legal claims protected by the access-to-courts
right [are] nonfrivolous appeals from a conviction, habeas petitions, or civil rights suits.')
(internal citations omitted); Lewis v. Cook County Bd. of Comm'rs, 6 F. App'x 428, 430 (7th Cir.
2001) ("[Hie does not describe a single legal case or claim that was in any thwarted because the
mail room staff opened his legal mail.").
28. The Eleventh Circuit has also held the right arises from the Fourteenth Amendment. Hall,
2008 WL 5377741, at *1 ("The Fourteenth Amendment gives prisoners a right of access to the
courts.") (citing Wilson v. Blankenship, 163 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11 th Cir. 1998)).
29. Rix v. Wells, No. 8:08-CV-1728-T-30MAP, 2008 WL 4279661, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Sept.
16, 2008).
30. See AI-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317, 1334 (11th Cir. 2008); Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d
353, 359 (3d Cir. 2006) (a prison's practice of opening attorney mail interferes with protected
communications and strips them of their confidentiality and "accordingly, impinges upon the
inmate's right to freedom of speech").
31. See Hall v. Chester, No. 08-3235-SAC, 2008 WL 4657279, at *4 (D. Kan. Oct. 20, 2008)
("[T]he right to receive unopened legal mail is not, in other words, entitled to independent First
Amendment protection.") (quoting West v. Endicott, No. 06-C-763, 2008 WL 906225 (E.D. Wis.
Mar. 31, 2008)).
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ticular rights for more information. Access-to-court claims clearly
require an actual injury, as opposed to the mere violation of those
rights.32 In turn, actual injury requires proof that prison officials' actions
actually impeded "the inmate's pursuit of nonfrivolous [sic], post-con-
viction claim or civil rights action."33 On the other hand, First Amend-
ment freedom of speech claims do not have this need to show "actual
injury."34 The implications of this distinction-that the very nature of
allegations by the prisoner is different under different origins of the
right-are both readily apparent, and clearly significant.
The problem, though, has been and continues to be just what those
rights entail for prisoners when balanced against the legitimate needs of
prison officials to operate the prisons, or at least when balanced in the
factual context the courts are presented with individual lawsuits.
While there are those who attack the Supreme Court for exhibiting
too much deference to prison officials,35 reasonable analysis shows that
what is normally determinative is the facts, not the legal standard. This
suggests that rather than merely rubber-stamping the requests of prison
officials, courts are actually engaging in the sort of factual balancing-test
imagined by such concepts of deference. The current test was estab-
lished in Turner v. Safley,36 and while some describe it as a four-part
test, it actually is a simple one-part test with four "factors" to use in
applying the test: "when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' con-
stitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests. 37 The four factors are: (1) a valid,
rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate
governmental interest put forward to justify it,38 (2) consideration of
alternative forms of expression available to the inmate,3 9 (3) the burden
on guards, prison officials, and other inmates if the prison is required to
provide the freedom claimed by the inmate,4" and (4) consideration of
32. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996); AI-Amin, 511 F.3d at 1332.
33. A prisoner raising this claim "must show actual injury in the pursuit of specific types of
nonfrivolous cases: direct or collateral attacks on sentences and challenges to conditions of
confinement. 'Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and
perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration."' Wilson v. Blankenship,
163 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11 th Cir. 1998) (internal citation and footnote omitted).
34. AI-Amin, 511 F.3d at 1334.
35. See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 542-53 (2006) (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ.,
dissenting); id. at 553-56 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Jennifer N. Wimsatt, Note,
Rendering Turner Toothless: The Supreme Court's Decision in Beard v. Banks, 57 DuKE L.J.
1209 (2008); The Supreme Court, 2005 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 4, at 263.
36. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
37. Id. at 89.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 90.
40. Id.
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the existence of less restrictive alternatives that might satisfy the govern-
mental interest.4'
Thus, in Turner, the Court turned to the record and the evidence
offered to justify that prison's prohibition on correspondence between
institutions. As a preliminary matter, they looked at the interest to justify
it, where the Court found the testimony offered to the effect that restrict-
ing communications among gang members and similar communications
between felons was a legitimate security interest. There was clearly a
connection between prohibiting correspondence and that interest. Hav-
ing found the connection, the Court then considered the four factors, but
only briefly. First, given that the regulation prohibited all written com-
munications, and oral communications were not available, the Court
could say only that it was a limited amount of speech that was being
affected.42 The Court acknowledged that a true prohibition was one that
left the inmates with no way of communicating with each other, but said
not all communications were being prevented here.
In Beard v. Banks,43 some see the Court as, in effect, reducing the
four factors to one, at least where the regulation is to further the pris-
oner's rehabilitation (an interest not present in Turner and the other
major decisions on point). However, the Beard decision can also be seen
to be more a product of its unusual or even unique factual scenario than
an attempt to narrow the rights of prisoners.
In Beard, Banks-the inmate suing-was one of the forty most
dangerous and recalcitrant inmates in the Pennsylvania system. Normal
restrictions on activities, including communications such as legal mail,
were, according to the prison officials, not enough for prisoners such as
he. Thus, the issue for the Court was whether the Pennsylvania rule
prohibiting all access to newspapers, magazines, and personal photo-
graphs (but permitting legal mail, personal correspondence, and library
books, among other things) violated Banks's constitutional rights in his
rather unique circumstances." Banks was represented by counsel at all
stages, something the Court made note of,45 and the Court immediately
focused not on the Turner standards, but on the state of the record as it
related to the propriety of the summary judgment granted to the defend-
ants. For example, the Court noted that Banks's counsel did not file any
opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, did not
41. Id. at 90-91.
42. Id. at 92 ("[T]he correspondence regulation does not deprive prisoners of all means of
expression. Rather, it bars communication only with a limited class of other people with whom
prison officials have particular cause to be concerned . .
43. 548 U.S. 521 (2006).
44. Id. at 524-25.
45. Id. at 527.
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seek to "place any significant fact in dispute," and failed "specifically to
challenge the facts identified in the defendant's statement undisputed of
facts," meaning "Banks is deemed to have admitted the validity of the
facts contained in the Secretary's statement."46 The Court's decision
proceeded for several pages to discuss the lawsuit in terms of the facts
and factual issues, or lack thereof, in the record, and only then did it
proceed to address the Turner standard. When it ultimately applied the
standard, the Court relied heavily on what it perceived to be the record at
the time the trial court entered summary judgment for the defendant. The
Court then found, on that factual record, that the Turner standard had
been met.4 7 Finally, the Court noted that it was not trying to foreclose
inmates' claims, but simply deciding on the facts before it: "Here prison
authorities responded adequately through their statement and deposition
to the allegations in the complaint. And the plaintiff failed to point to
specific facts in the record that could lead a rational trier of fact to find
in his favor."4 To be fair, the dissent challenged the Court's view of the
record, but that discussion, too, was based on the facts as much as the
alleged change of the legal standard.49
Eleventh Circuit decisions (especially district court decisions) as
well as decisions from other circuits seem to bear out the recognition
that the facts, not the legal standard, are what is critical. In Al-Amin, for
example, the allegations were that prison officials had repeatedly opened
privileged legal mail outside of Al-Amin's presence, in violation of his
constitutional rights. The defendants' motion for summary judgment
was denied, and they appealed. The Eleventh Circuit's decision was pre-
mised on the facts, and not any legal dispute. Thus, with regard to the
access-to-courts claim-the one emanating from a penumbra of enumer-
ated rights in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights-the decision was
based on the absence of any facts upon which actual injury can be
shown.
On the other hand, with regard to the First Amendment claim, the
Eleventh Circuit ruled for Al-Amin because of those same facts. Thus,
on the qualified immunity argument, the Court ruled that based on the
"exact factual identity between prior case law and defendants' factual
conduct," the qualified immunity defense failed, at least at the summary
judgment stage. As the Court noted in a footnote reminiscent of the
Supreme Court's decision in Banks, the defendants raised legal argu-
ments based on alleged facts that were not argued below on summary
46. Id.
47. Id. at 531.
48. Id. at 536 (internal quotation marks omitted).
49. Id. at 544-47 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
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judgment, and thus could not be used in rendering the appellate court's
decision."
Even more recent decisions emphasize the critical nature of the
facts. In Corker v. Cannon, a pro se action, Corker alleged unconstitu-
tional interference with his legal mail, but the facts he alleged in support
of his claim were insufficient, so the complaint was dismissed with leave
to amend those facts, if he was able.5
Yet, despite this apparent reluctance to actually discuss the consti-
tutional basis for the rights of access-to-courts, the courts continue to
rely upon such rights, and find them in the penumbra. 2 Similarly, in Pro
v. Bandy, the inmate's complaint was dismissed not because of a new
standard, but because the facts he alleged did not meet existing stan-
dards. 3 On the other hand, in an earlier post-Banks decision by the same
district judge, Daker v. Ferrero,54 on cross-motions for summary judg-
ment, the court held genuine issues of fact existed with regard to por-
tions of the inmate's claim that required a trial. In a lengthy decision, the
court analyzed the facts or factual issues in the record, and ruled based
on that. Thus, in a section entitled "Materials Upon Which Defendants
Have Failed To Proffer Any Legitimate Reason For a Content-Based
Denial," where the court found genuine issues of fact, Daker prevailed;
where it did not, he lost.
5
Some decisions from other circuits are also instructive. For exam-
ple, three district judges faced the similar issue of whether they should
enjoin Pennsylvania prison officials from opening legal and court mail
outside the inmates' presence. Two refused, while in Fontroy v. Beard
5 6
a third entered the injunction and refused to stay its order while the
officials appealed, despite Beard v. Banks. The court noted that Beard
does not stand for the proposition that more deference is owed to prison
officials, or that prison officials after Beard but not after Turner need
not provide as much factual support to justify the restrictions on inmates
50. A1-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317, 1336 n.38 (1lth Cir. 2008).
51. No. 8:08-CV-564-T-27TBM, 2008 WL 1847304, at *2-3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2008).
52. Barbara Arco, Comment, When Rights Collide: Reconciling the First Amendment Rights
of Opposing Parties in Civil Litigation, 52 U. MIAMI L. REv. 587, 616-17 (1998) ("The right of
access to courts and the right to petition the government for redress of grievances spring from the
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No. 2:06-CV-667-WKW, 2008 WL 4767471, at *1I- 10 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 29, 2008).
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communications. 7 Instead, as the court stated,
[u]nlike in this case, in Banks, the prison administration provided fac-
tual support for the rational connection between the challenged prison
regulation and the state's interest. Specifically, the prison officials
provided a statement of undisputed facts setting forth the bases for
the regulation. The statement of facts referred to depositions, policy
manuals and pleadings. The plaintiff did not challenge any of these
facts, which were deemed admitted.58
Distinguishing the two district courts who went the other way, the judge
in Fontroy noted that "[t]he Harper and Robinson courts undoubtedly
gave thoughtful and well reasoned consideration of the issue and the
facts presented. However, they did not have the benefit of a record
developed and analyzed by counsel. The plaintiffs in the other cases
acted pro se."59
CONCLUSION
The lesson of this analysis is that, while there is undoubtedly a
valid debate about the constitutional origin of the rights accorded to
inmates' communications, the Supreme Court has not focused on this
area of discussion. Instead, in each case, it has confirmed the principle
that what those rights protect is fact-based, with the level of deference
accorded to prison officials being specific to each individual case.
57. Id. at *3.
58. Id.
59. Id. at *2.
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